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Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
“The American people have no doubt that more people die from coal dust 
than from nuclear reactions, but they fear the prospect of a nuclear reactor more 
than they do the empirical data that would suggest that more people die from coal 
dust, having coal-fired burners. They also know that more lives would be saved if 
we took that 25 percent we spend in the intensive care units in the last few months 
of the elderly’s lives, more children would be saved. But part of our culture is that 
we have concluded as a culture that we are going to rightly, or wrongly, we are 
going to spend the money, costing more lives, on the elderly. . . . I think it’s 
incredibly presumptuous and elitist for political scientists to conclude that the 
American people’s cultural values in fact are not ones that lend themselves to a 
cost-benefit analysis and presume that they would change their cultural values if in 
fact they were aware of the cost-benefit analysis.”1                     Joseph Biden 
 
Many people have argued for cost-benefit analysis on economic grounds.2 
On their view, a primary goal of regulation is to promote economic efficiency, 
and cost-benefit analysis is admirably well-suited to that goal. Arguments of this 
kind have met with sharp criticism from those who reject the efficiency criterion3 
or who believe that in practice, cost-benefit analysis is likely to produce a kind of 
regulatory paralysis.4 
In this essay I offer support for cost-benefit analysis, not from the standpoint 
of conventional economics, but on grounds associated with cognitive psychology 
and behavioral economics. My basic suggestion is that cost-benefit analysis is 
best defended as a means of overcoming predictable problems in individual and 
social cognition. Most of these problems might be collected under the general 
heading of selective attention. Cost-benefit analysis should be understood as a 
method for putting “on screen” important social facts that might otherwise 
escape private and public attention. Thus understood, cost-benefit analysis is a 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School.  I 
am grateful to Matthew Adler, Jill Hasday, Eric Posner, and Richard Posner for helpful comments on a 
previous draft; special thanks to Eric Posner for many helpful discussions. Brian Lehman and Brooke May 
provided excellent research assistance and valuable comments and criticisms. 
1 Confirmation Hearings for Stephen G. Breyer, to be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (July 14, 1994) (Miller Reporting 
transcript). 
2 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public & Private Responsibilities for Risk (1992); W. Kip Viscusi, 
Risk Equity, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000). 
3 See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993). 
4 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal 
Bureaucracy (1991). 
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way of ensuring better priority-setting and of overcoming predictable obstacles 
to desirable regulation, whatever may be our criteria for deciding the hardest 
questions about that topic.  
Of course much of the controversy over cost-benefit analysis stems from the 
difficulty of specifying, with particularity, what that form of analysis entails. 
None of the cognitive points made here supports any particular understanding 
of cost-benefit analysis. Certainly I do not mean to embrace the controversial and 
indeed implausible proposition that all regulatory decisions should be made by 
aggregating private willingness to pay, as if economic efficiency is or should be 
the goal of all regulation.5 I will attempt instead to provide an understanding of 
cost-benefit analysis that is agnostic on large issues of the right and the good, and 
that can attract support from people with diverse theoretical commitments, or 
with uncertainty about the appropriate theoretical commitments.6 In this sense I 
attempt to produce an incompletely theorized agreement on a certain form of cost-
benefit analysis—an agreement on a form of cost-benefit analysis to which many 
different people, with diverse and competing views, should be willing to 
subscribe. This is partly an attempt to respond to the most natural objection to 
my principal claim here, an objection that would stress the possibility that 
cognitive problems would reappear in the values that end up being associated 
with various states of affairs. 
The paper is organized as follows. In sections I, II, and III, I seek to defend 
the general idea of cost-benefit analysis, not as embodying any sectarian 
conception of value, but as a way of overcoming predictable problems in 
understanding risks to life and health at both the individual and social levels. In 
section IV, I briefly attempt to specify what cost-benefit analysis might be 
understood to entail. My goal is to show how this method, conceived in a 
particular way, might attract support from people with varying conceptions of 
the good and the right, including, for example, neoclassical economists and those 
who are quite skeptical about some normative claims in neoclassical economics, 
and including those who do and who do not take private preferences, and 
willingness to pay, as the proper foundation for regulatory policy. In other 
                                                 
5 See Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 1999); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice ch. 9 (1997); Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000) ; Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 
2000). See, in particular, Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 Am. Eon. Rev. 1, 17 (1995) (“There 
are plenty of social choice problems in all this, but in analyzing them, we have to go beyond looking only 
for the best reflection of given individual preferences, or the most acceptable procedures for choices based 
on those preferences.”) (emphasis in original). 
6 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note, which is in the same general spirit as 
this essay, and from which I have learned a great deal. See also Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000), which seems to me in the same basic family. 
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words, I try to show how a certain understanding of cost-benefit analysis might 
contain considerable appeal precisely because it overcomes problems in 
individual cognition, and do so without taking a stand on controversial issues 
about the ultimate goals of regulation and law. 
A. A Tale of Two Tables 
Let us begin with two simple tables. It is well known that there is a great deal 
of variability in national expenditures per life saved. Consider the following, 
which has come to define many discussions of these problems7: 
 
Table 1: Cost Per Life Saved 
 







Cost per premature 
death averted 
($ millions 1990) 
Unvented Space Heater Ban CPSC 0.1 
Aircraft Cabin Fire Protection Standard FAA 0.1 
Auto Passive Restraint/Seat Belt Standards NHTSA 0.1 
Steering Column Protection Standard NHTSA 0.1 
Underground Construction Standards OSHA-S 0.1 
Trihalomethane Drinking Water Standards EPA 0.2 
Aircraft Seat Cushion Flammability Standard FAA 0.4 
Alcohol and Drug Control Standards FRA 0.4 
Auto Fuel-System Integrity Standard NHTSA 0.4 
Standards for Servicing Auto Wheel Rims OSHA-S 0.4 
Aircraft Floor Emergency Lighting Standard FAA 0.6 
Concrete & Masonry Construction Standards OSHA-S 0.6 
Crane Suspended Personnel Platform Standard OSHA-S 0.7 
Passive Restraints for Trucks & Buses (Proposed)  NHTSA 0.7 
Side-Impact Standards for Autos (Dynamic) NHTSA 0.8 
Children’s Sleepwear Flammability Ban CPSC 0.8 
Auto Side Door Support Standards NHTSA 0.8 
Low Altitude Windshear Equipment & Training Standards FAA 1.3 
Electrical Equipment Standards (Metal Mines)  MSHA 1.4 
Trenching and Excavation Standards OSHA-S 1.5 
                                                 
7 Based on data from Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government Fiscal 
Year 1992 Pt 2, 370 Tbl C-2 (GPO 1991). 
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Cost per premature 
death averted 
($ millions 1990) 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) Systems FAA 1.5 
Hazard Communication Standard OSHA-S 1.6 
Side-Impact Standards for Trucks, Buses, and MPVs (Proposed) NHTSA  2.2 
Grain Dust Explosion Prevention Standards OSHA-S  2.8 
Rear Lap/Shoulder Belts for Autos NHTSA 3.2 
Standards for Radionuclides in Uranium Mines EPA 3.4 
Benzine NESHAP (Original: Fugitive Emissions)  EPA 3.4 
Ethylene Dibromide Drinking Water Standard  EPA 5.7 
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Coke Byproducts) EPA 6.1 
Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 8.3 
Benzene Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 8.9 
Electrical Equipment Standards (Coal Mines) MSHA 9.2 
Arsenic Emission Standards for Glass Plants EPA 13.5 
Ethylene Oxide Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 20.5 
Arsenic/Copper NESHAP EPA 23.0 
Hazardous Waste Listing for Petroleum Refining Sludge EPA 27.6 
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Inactive Sites) EPA 31.7 
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Transfer Operations) EPA 32.9 
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Active Sites) EPA 45.0 
Acrylonitrile Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 51.5 
Coke Ovens Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 63.5 
Lockout/Tagout OSHA-S 70.9 
Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 74.0 
Arsenic Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 106.9 
Asbestos Ban EPA 110.7 
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Cattlefeed Ban FDA 124.8 
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Waste Operations) EPA 168.2 
1,2 Dichloropropane Drinking Water Standard EPA 653.0 
Hazardous Waste Land Disposal Ban (1st 3rd) EPA 4,190.4 
Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Standards (Proposed) EPA 19,107.0 
Formaldehyde Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 86,201.8 
Atrazine/Alachlor Drinking Water Standard EPA 92,069.7 
Hazardous Waste Listing for Wood-Preserving Chemicals EPA 5,700,000 
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This table should be taken with many grains of salt.8 It does not contain 
nearly all of the benefits from regulation, including those that fall short of 
mortalities averted (including illnesses averted, benefits for animals, and 
aesthetic and recreational gains). An adequate cost-benefit analysis would 
certainly take those benefits into account. We will shortly see that the table 
depends on many contentious assumptions, above all involving the appropriate 
discount rate; modest changes in the discount rate can greatly reduce the 
expenditures and the disparities. But at the very least, the table creates a 
presumption that the current system of regulation suffers from serious 
misallocation of resources. It also suggests that with better allocations, we could 
obtain large gains. Indeed, a recent study finds that it would be possible to save 
the same number of lives that we now save with tens of billions of dollars left 
over—and that better priority-setting could save 60,000 lives, and 636,000 life-
years, annually at the same price.9 
What is the source of the misallocations? Interest-group power undoubtedly 
plays a substantial role, as well-organized groups are able to obtain measures in 
their interest or to fend off measures that would harm them, and as poorly 
organized ones typically fail. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis might be defended 
partly as a corrective to interest-group power, operating as it might as a kind of 
technocratic check on measures that would do little good or even produce net 
harm (and also on measures that do much less good than they should).10 But 
officials are of course responsive not only to interest groups but also to general 
public pressures, and thus part of the answer must lie in the distinctive 
judgments of ordinary people, who do not assess risks through a well-informed 
cost-benefit lens. Indeed, divergences between expert and lay assessments of 
risks have been demonstrated in many places. Consider this comparison.11 
 
Table 2: Rating health risks 
 
Public EPA Experts 
1. Hazardous waste sites Medium-to-low 
2. Exposure to worksite chemicals High 
3. Industrial pollution of waterways Low 
                                                 
8 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998). 
9 See Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-
Saving, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved 167, 172-74 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). 
10 Of course it is possible that the content of the cost-benefit test will reflect interest-group power. 
11 See Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 21 (1993).  
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Public EPA Experts 
4. Nuclear accident radiation Not ranked 
5. Radioactive waste Not ranked 
6. Chemical leaks from underground storage tanks Medium-to-low 
7. Pesticides High 
8. Pollution from industrial accidents Medium-to-low 
9. Water pollution from farm runoff Medium 
10. Tap water contamination High 
11. Industrial air pollution High 
12. Ozone layer destruction High 
13. Coastal water contamination Low 
14. Sewage-plant water pollution Medium-to-low 
15. Vehicle exhaust High 
16. Oil spills Medium-to-low 
17. Acid rain High 
18. Water pollution from urban runoff Medium 
19. Damaged wetlands Low 
20. Genetic alteration Low 
21. Non-hazardous waste sites Medium-to-low 
22. Greenhouse effect Low 
23. Indoor air pollution High 
24. X-ray radiation Not ranked 
25. Indoor radon High 
26. Microwave oven radiation Not ranked 
 
The EPA itself has found that EPA policies are responsive not to expert 
judgments, but to lay assessments of risks.12 Indeed, EPA policies track ordinary 
judgments extremely well. 
If we put together these two tables, we can suggest a general hypothesis. The 
government currently allocates its limited resources poorly, and it does so partly 
because it is responsive to ordinary judgments about the magnitude of risks. A 
government that could insulate itself from misinformed judgments could save 
tens of thousands of lives and tens of billions of dollars annually. Let us attempt 
to be more specific about the cognitive problems that help account for current 
problems. 
                                                 
12 See id. 
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I. Six Problems in the Public Demand for Regulation 
For the moment, I attempt no controversial specification of cost-benefit 
analysis and understand the term broadly to refer to a regulatory method that 
calls for regulators to identify, and make relevant for purposes of decision, the 
good effects and the bad effects of regulation, and to quantify those as much as 
possible in terms of both dollar equivalents and life-years saved, hospital 
admissions prevented, workdays gained, and so forth. Let us also assume that 
cost-benefit analysis, thus understood, can accommodate distributional factors, 
by, for example, giving distributional weights to certain adverse effects, or by 
assuming uniform numbers for various goods (such as increased longevity) so as 
to ensure that they do not vary in accordance with wealth.  
It is obvious that people, including government officials, often lack risk-
related information; they may not know the nature of the health risks at issue, 
nor may they know the adverse consequences of risk reduction. By itself this 
point argues for cost-benefit analysis, simply as a means of producing the 
relevant information. The public demand for regulation is often be based on 
misunderstandings of facts.13 But put this obvious point to one side. Why, 
exactly, might people’s judgments about risk and risk regulation go badly 
wrong?14 There are six points here. 
A. The Availability Heuristic 
The first problem is purely cognitive: the use of the availability heuristic in 
thinking about risks.15 It is well-established that people tend to think that events 
are more probable if they can recall an incident of its occurrence.16 Consider, for 
example, the fact that people typically think that more words, on any given page, 
will end with the letters “ing,” than have “n” as the second-to-last letter (though 
a moment’s reflection shows that this is not possible).17 With respect to risks, 
                                                 
13 A colorful discussion is Barry Glassner, The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong 
Things (1999). 
14 Some of these problems may infect market behavior as well, and when this is so there is a problem with 
using private willingness to pay as the basis for regulation, since private willingness to pay will (by 
hypothesis) be based on a misunderstanding of the facts. But markets contain some safeguards against these 
errors, through the budget constraint and opportunities for learning, and in any case the form of cost-benefit 
analysis that I support would not rest on mistaken factual judgments, as discussed in more detail below. 
15 See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. 
Legal Stud. 747, 749-760 (1990). 
16 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky 
eds., 1982) (describing the availability heuristic). 
17 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in 
Probability Judgment, 90 Psychol. Rev. 293, 295 (1983). 
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judgments are typically affected by the availability heuristic, so that people 
overestimate the number of deaths from highly publicized events (motor vehicle 
accidents, tornadoes, floods, botulism), but underestimate the number from less 
publicized sources (stroke, heart disease, stomach cancer).18 Similarly, much of 
the concern with nuclear power undoubtedly stems from its association with 
memorable events, including Hiroshima, Chernobyl, and Three-Mile Island. 
To the extent that people lack information, or base their judgments on 
mental short-cuts that produce errors,19 a highly responsive government is likely 
to blunder. Cost-benefit analysis is a natural corrective, above all because it 
focuses attention on the actual effects of regulation, including, in some cases, the 
existence of surprisingly small benefits from regulatory controls. To this extent 
cost-benefit analysis should not be taken as undemocratic, but, on the contrary, 
should be seen as a means of fortifying (properly specified) democratic goals, by 
ensuring that government decisions are responsive to well-informed public 
judgments. 
B. Aggravating Social Influences: Informational and Reputational Cascades 
The availability heuristic does not, of course, operate in a social vacuum. It 
interacts with emphatically social processes, and in particular with informational 
and reputational forces.20 When one person says, through words or deeds, that 
something is or is not dangerous, he creates an informational externality.21 A signal 
by some person A will provide relevant data to others. When there is little 
private information, such a signal may initiate an informational cascade, with 
significant consequences for private and public behavior, and with possibly 
distorting effects on regulatory policy.22 
Imagine, for example, that A says that abandoned hazardous waste sites are 
dangerous, or that A initiates protest activity because such a site is located 
nearby. B, otherwise skeptical or in equipoise, may go along with A; C, otherwise 
an agnostic, may be convinced that if A and B share the relevant belief, the belief 
                                                 
18 Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 218 (2d ed. 1994). 
19 Other heuristics are likely to be at work, such as the representativeness heuristic, but availability is the 
most important source of distorted public judgments.  See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 
1982). 
20 I draw in this section on Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1999). 
21 See Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search, 108 
Econ. J. 60 (1998). 
22 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 720 
(1999). 
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must be true; and it will take a confident D to resist the shared judgments of A, B, 
and C. The result of this set of influences can be social cascades, as hundreds, 
thousands, or millions of people come to accept a certain belief simply because of 
what they think other people believe.23 There is nothing fanciful to the idea. 
Cascade effects help account for the existence of widespread public concern 
about abandoned hazardous waste dumps (a relatively trivial environmental 
hazard), and in more recent years, they spurred grossly excessive public fears of 
the pesticide Alar, of risks from plane crashes, and of dangers of shootings in 
schools in the aftermath of the murders in Littleton, Colorado. Such effects 
recently helped produce massive dislocations in beef production in Europe in 
connection with “mad cow disease”; they are currently giving rise to growing 
European fear of genetic engineering of food. 
On the reputational side, cognitive effects may be amplified as well.24 If 
many people are alarmed about some risk, you may not voice your doubts about 
whether the alarm is merited, simply in order not to seem obtuse, cruel, or 
indifferent. And if many people believe that a certain risk is trivial, you may not 
disagree through words or deeds, lest you appear cowardly or confused. The 
result of these forces can be cascade effects, mediated by the availability heuristic. 
Such effects can produce a public demand for regulation even though the 
relevant risks are trivial. At the same time, there may be little or no demand for 
regulation of risks that are, in fact, quite large in magnitude. Self-interested 
private groups can exploit these forces, often by using the availability heuristic. 
Consider the fact that European companies have tried to play up fears of 
genetically engineered food as a way of fending off American competition. 
Cost-benefit analysis has a natural role here. If it is made relevant to 
decision, it can counteract cascade effects induced by informational and 
reputational forces, especially when the availability heuristic is at work. The 
effect of cost-benefit analysis is to subject a public demand for regulation to a 
kind of technocratic scrutiny, to ensure that the demand is not rooted in myth, 
and to ensure as well that government is regulating risks even when the public 
demand (because insufficiently informed) is low. And here too there is no 
democratic problem with the inquiry into consequences. If people’s concern is 
fueled by informational forces having little reliability, and if people express 
concern even though they are not fearful, a governmental effort to “cool” 
popular reactions is hardly inconsistent with democratic ideals. Similarly, there is 
                                                 
23 See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 
in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathyrn Ierulli eds., 1995). 
24 See id. at 727. 
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nothing undemocratic about a governmental effort to divert resources to serious 
problems that have not been beneficiaries of cascade effects.  
C. Dangers On-Screen, Benefits Off-Screen 
Why are people so concerned about the risks of nuclear power, when experts 
tend to believe that the risks are quite low—lower, in fact, than the risks from 
competing energy sources, such as coal-fired power plants, which produce 
relatively little public objection? Why do they believe that small risks from 
pesticides should be regulated, even if comparatively small risks from X-rays are 
quite tolerable?  
Suggestive answers come from research suggesting that for many activities 
that pose small risks but that nonetheless receive public concern, people perceive 
low benefits as well as high risks.25 For example, nuclear power itself is seen as a 
low-benefit, high-risk activity. Similar findings appear for some activities that are 
in fact relatively high-risk: a judgment of “low risk” accompanies a judgment of 
“high benefits.” The very fact that they are known to have high benefits skews 
judgment in their favor, and hence makes people understate the costs as well. 
The obvious conclusion is that sometimes people favor regulation of some 
risks because the underlying activities are not seen to have compensating 
benefits.26 Thus for some activities, tradeoffs are not perceived at all. Dangers are 
effectively on-screen, but benefits are off-screen. Note that this is not because 
such activities do not, in fact, have compensating benefits. It is because of a kind 
of perceptual illusion.  
An important factor here is loss aversion. People tend to be loss averse, which 
means that a loss from the status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain is 
seen as desirable.27 In the context of risk regulation, the consequence is that any 
newly introduced risk, or any aggravation of existing risks, is seen as a serious 
problem, even if the accompanying benefits (a gain from the status quo and 
hence perceived as less salient and less important) are considerable.28 Thus when 
                                                 
25 The fact that nuclear power, and application of pesticides, produce benefits as well as risks may not 
“register” on the lay viewscreen, and this may help produce a “high risk” judgment.  See Ali Siddiq 
Alhakami and Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship Between Perceived Risk and 
Perceived Benefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085, 1088 (1994). 
26 See Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (1996), for a detailed discussion of how this point bears on the 
different  risk judgments of experts and lay people. 
27 See Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Economics, in Quasi Rational 
Economics 137, 143 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991) (arguing that “losses loom larger than gains”); Daniel 
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325, 1328 (1990); Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in John H. 
Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, eds, The Handbook of Experimental Economics 665-670 (1995). 
28 For some policy implications of loss aversion, see Jack L. Knetsch, Reference States, Fairness, and Choice 
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a new risk adds danger, people may focus on the danger itself, and not on the 
benefits that accompany the danger. And an important problem here is that in 
many cases where dangers are on-screen and benefits off-screen, the magnitude 
of the danger is actually quite low. Cost-benefit analysis can be a corrective here, 
by placing the various effects on-screen. 
D. Systemic Effects and “Health-Health Tradeoffs” 
Often people focus on small pieces of complex problems, and causal changes 
are hard to trace. Consider an analogy. The German psychologist Dietrich Dorner 
has done some illuminating computer experiments designed to see whether 
people can engage in successful social engineering.29 Participants are asked to 
solve problems faced by the inhabitants of some region of the world. Through 
the magic of the computer, many policy initiatives are available to solve the 
relevant problems (improved care of cattle, childhood immunization, drilling 
more wells). But most of the participants produce eventual calamities, because 
they do not see the complex, system-wide effects of particular interventions. 
Only the rare participant can see a number of steps down the road—to 
understand the multiple effects of one-shot interventions on the system. 
Often regulation has similar systemic effects. A decision to regulate nuclear 
power may, for example, increase the demand for coal-fired power plants, with 
harmful environmental consequences.30 A decision to impose fuel economy 
standards on new cars may cause a “downsizing” of the fleet, and in that way 
increase risks to life. A decision to ban asbestos may cause manufacturers to use 
less safe substitutes. Regulation of tropospheric ozone may control the health 
dangers of ozone, but ozone has various benefits as well, including protection 
against cataracts and skin cancer; hence regulation of ozone may cause health 
problems equal to those that it reduces.31 Indeed, regulation of ozone will 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Measure to Value Environmental Changes, in Environment, Ethics, and Behavior: The Psychology of 
Environmental Valuation and Degradation 52, 64-65 (Max H. Bazerman, David M. Messick, Ann E. 
Tenbrunsel & Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni eds., 1997). 
29 See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them 
Right (1996). 
30 See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court’s Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1833, 1835-90 (1978).  See generally Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of 
Regulatory Authority, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1002 (1987). 
31 See Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screening by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the 
NAAQS, 31 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 142A, 144A (1997) (estimating that the EPA’s new ozone NAAQS could 
cause 25 to 50 more melanoma skin cancer deaths and increase the number of cataract cases by 13,000 to 
28,000 each year).  See also Ralph L. Keeney & Kenneth Green, Estimating Fatalities Induced by Economic 
Impacts of EPA’s Ozone and Particulate Standards 8 (Reason Public Policy Institute, Policy Study No. 225, 
June 1997) (calculating that if attainment of the new standards costs $10 billion annually, a number well 
within EPA’s estimated cost range, it will contribute to 2,200 premature deaths annually). On the general 
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increase electricity prices, and because higher electricity prices will deprive poor 
people of air conditioning or lead them to use it less, such regulation may 
literally kill people.32 
These are simply a few examples of situations in which a government agency 
is inevitably making “health-health tradeoffs” in light of the systemic effects of 
one-shot interventions. Indeed, any regulation that imposes high costs will, by 
virtue of that fact, produce some risks to life and health, since “richer is safer.”33 
A virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that it tends to overcome people’s tendency to 
focus on parts of problems, by requiring them to look globally at the 
consequences of apparently isolated actions. 
E. Emotions and Alarmist Bias 
A set of data now suggests that people are subject to “alarmist bias.”34 The 
mere existence of discussions of new risks can aggravate concern, even when the 
discussions take the form of assurances that the risk level is relatively low. And 
when presented with information suggesting that a risk may range from A (low) 
to Z (high), the high risk number is especially salient, and it appears to have a 
disproportionate effect on behavior. 
A recent paper by George Loewenstein et al. suggests that risk-related 
concerns are often based on “feelings” rather than judgments.35 Thus risk-related 
objections can be a product not so much of thinking as of intense emotions, often 
produced by extremely vivid images of what might go wrong. This point is 
supported by evidence that reported feelings of worry are sometimes sensitive 
not to the probability of the bad outcome, but only to the severity of the bad 
outcome.36 Vivid mental pictures of widespread death or catastrophe can drive a 
demand for risk regulation. Consider, for example, the motivations of those who 
press for regulation of airplane safety in the aftermath of an airplane crash, even 
though such regulation may increase travel risks on balance (by driving up the 
                                                                                                                                                 
phenomenon, see John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, Risk Versus Risk (1995). 
32 See C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform, 11 Tulane Envt’l L.J. 235 (1998). 
33 John D. Graham, Bei-Hung Chang, & John S. Evans, Poorer Is Riskier, 12 Risk Analysis 333, 333-35 
(1992); Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health-Health Analysis, 22 Ecol. 
L. Q. 729 (1995); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of Regulations, 8 J. Risk & 
Uncertainty 95 (1994); Aaron Wildavsky, Richer is Safer, 60 Pub. Interest 23 (1980); Aaron Wildavsky, 
Searching for Safety 59-75 (1988). 
34 See W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 Econ. J.1657, 1657-58 (1997) 
(studying situations under which “[n]ew information about risks may generate alarmist actions that are not 
commensurate with the magnitude of the risks”). 
35 See Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K. & Welch, E. S., Risk as Feelings (unpublished draft 
5/4/99). 
36 Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, Draft at 12. 
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price of flying and causing a shift to driving, a more dangerous form of 
transportation).37 
It is important to be careful with the relevant categories here. There is no 
sharp distinction between “cognition” and “emotion.”38 Emotions are generally 
the products of beliefs, and hence an emotional reaction to risk—terror, for 
example—is generally mediated by judgments.39 But this is not always true; 
sometimes the operation of the brain allows intense emotional reactions with 
minimal cognitive activity.40 In any case the judgments that fuel emotions may be 
unreliable. We need not venture into controversial territory in order to urge not 
that emotions are free of cognition, but that some risks seem to produce 
extremely sharp, largely visceral reactions. These reactions are sometimes largely 
impervious to argument. Indeed, experience with “mass panics” has shown 
exactly this structure, as assurances based on statistical evidence have little effect 
in the face of vivid images of what might go wrong.41 Some fears even appear to 
have a genetic foundation; consider, as a possible example, fear of snakes, which 
appears in people who have no reason to think that snakes are dangerous. 
The role of cost-benefit analysis is straightforward here. Just as the Senate 
was designed to have a “cooling effect” on the passions of the House of 
Representatives, so cost-benefit analysis might ensure that policy is driven not by 
hysteria or alarm, but by a full appreciation of the effects of relevant risks and 
their control. If the hysteria survives an investigation of consequences, then the 
hysteria is fully rational, and an immediate and intensive regulatory response is 
entirely appropriate.  
Nor is cost-benefit analysis, in this setting, only a check on unwarranted 
regulation. It can and should serve as a spur to regulation as well. If risks do not 
produce visceral reactions, partly because the underlying activities do not yield 
vivid mental images, cost-benefit analysis can show that they nonetheless 
warrant regulatory control. The elimination of lead in gasoline is a case in point.42 
                                                 
37 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security: An Analysis of the White House 
Commission’s Recommendations, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 791 (1997).  
38 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in the Criminal Law, 96 Colum. 
L. Rev 269 (1996); Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind (1999). 
39 See Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (forthcoming); Elster, supra note. 
40 See Loewenstein et al., supra. 
41 See the discussion of Love Canal in Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 691-98 (1999).  
42 See Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997). 
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F. Separate Evaluation and Incoherence 
Suppose that you are asked to say, without reference to any other problem, 
how much you would be willing to pay to protect certain threats to coral reefs. 
Now suppose that you are asked to say, without reference to any other problem. 
how much you would pay to protect against skin cancer among the elderly. 
Suppose, finally, that you are asked to say how much you would be willing to 
pay to protect certain threats to coral reefs and how much you would be willing 
to pay to protect against skin cancer among the elderly. Empirical evidence 
suggests that people’s answers to questions, taken in isolation, are very different 
from their answer to questions when they are asked to engage in cross-category 
comparisons.43 It appears that when people assess problems in isolation, they do 
so by reference to other problems in the same basic category—and that this 
intuitive process is dramatically altered when people are explicitly told to assess 
problems from other categories as well. The result of assessing individual 
problems, taken in isolation, is to produce what people would themselves 
consider a form of incoherence. 
The forms of regulatory spending shown in Table I undoubtedly reflect, in 
part, the kinds of irrationality that follow from judgments that are made without 
close reference to other problems from different categories. Incoherence is the 
natural result of the relevant cognitive processes. The argument for a form of 
cost-benefit analysis is straightforward: It operates as a built-in corrective to 
some of the distortions that come from taking problems in isolation. The point 
applies to “contingent valuation” assessments; but it operates more broadly with 
respect to expenditure decisions that otherwise risk incoherence, simply by 
virtue of the fact that they operate without looking at other problems, including 
those from other categories. 
G. General Implications 
The cognitive argument for cost-benefit analysis, thus understood, is now in 
place. It is true but obvious to say that people lack information and that their lack 
of information can lead to an inadequate or excessive demand for regulation, or a 
form of “paranoia and neglect.”44 What is less obvious is that predictable features 
of cognition will lead to a demand for regulation that is unlikely to be based on 
the facts. When people ask for regulation because of fears fueled by availability 
cascades, and when the benefits from the risk-producing activity are not 
                                                 
43 See Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Iliana Ritov, & Cass R.Sunstein, Reversals of Judgment: The Effect 
of Cross-Category Comparisons on Intendedly Absolute Responses (unpublished manuscript 1999). 
44 See John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: 
Getting Better Results from Regulation 183 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). 
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registering, it would be highly desirable to create cost-benefit filters on their 
requests. When interest-groups exploit cognitive mechanisms to create 
unwarranted fear or diminish concern with serious problems, it is desirable to 
have institutional safeguards. When people fail to ask for regulation for related 
reasons, it would be desirable to create a mechanism by which government 
might nonetheless act if the consequences of action would be desirable. Here too 
cost-benefit balancing might be desirable, as in fact it has proved to be in 
connection not only with the phase-out of lead but also with the Reagan 
Administration’s decision to phase-out CFC’s, motivated by a cost-benefit 
analysis suggesting that the phase-out would do far more good than harm.45 
A caveat: It is entirely possible that the public demand for regulation will 
result from something other than cognitive errors, even if the relevant risk seems 
low as a statistical matter. People may think, for example, that it is especially 
important to protect poor children from a certain risk in a geographically isolated 
area, and they may be willing to devote an unusually large amount to ensure 
that protection. What seems to be a cognitive error may turn out, on reflection, to 
be a judgment of value, and a judgment that can survive reflection. I will return 
to this point. For the moment note two simple points. Whether an error is 
involved is an empirical question, subject, at least in principle, to empirical 
testing. And nothing in cost-benefit analysis would prevent people from 
devoting resources to projects that they consider worthy, even if the risk is 
relatively low as a statistical matter. 
I have not yet discussed what cost-benefit analysis might specifically entail, 
and there are potentially serious controversies here. But it will be best to discuss 
that question after dealing with some direct objections. 
II. Objections: Populism, Quantification, and Rival Rationalities  
The argument made thus far, cautious though it may seem, runs into three 
obvious objections. The first involves democratic considerations; the second 
points to the limitations of quantification; the third involves the possibility that 
ordinary people’s judgments are based not on cognitive limitations, but on a kind 
of “rival rationality.” 
                                                 
45 See Economic Analysis at EPA, supra note 33.  See also Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New 
Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 63 (1991) (Reagan administration supported aggressive regulation 
largely because cost-benefit analysis from the Council of Economic Advisers demonstrated that “despite the 
scientific and economic uncertainties, the monetary benefits of preventing future deaths from skin cancer far 
outweighed costs of CFC controls as estimated either by industry or by EPA”). 
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A. Populism 
The first objection, populist in character, is captured by the opening 
quotation from Senator Biden. The objection would be that in a democracy, 
government properly responds to the social “demand” for law. Government 
does not legitimately reject that demand on the ground that cost-benefit analysis 
suggests that it should not act. On this view, a democratic government should be 
accountable. Any approach that uses efficiency, or technocratically-driven 
judgments, as a brake on accountability is fatally undemocratic. 
The problem with this objection is that it rests on a controversial and even 
unacceptable conception of democracy, one that sees responsiveness to citizens’ 
demands, whatever their factual basis, as the foundation of political legitimacy. If 
those demands are uninformed, it is perfectly appropriate for government to 
resist them. Indeed, it is far from clear that reasonable citizens want, or would 
want, their government to respond to their uninformed demand. The analysis 
thus far suggests that the relevant demands are, in fact, uninformed or 
unreflective. If this is so, they should be subject to deliberative constraints of the 
sort exemplified by cost-benefit analysis. After that analysis has been generated, 
and public officials have taken it into account, democratic safeguards continue to 
be available, and electoral sanctions can be brought to bear against those who 
have violated the public will. The simple point is that if, once informed if the 
cost-benefit tradeoff, people continue to seek some particular regulation, then 
democratic considerations require government to restrict their choice.46 At the 
very least, cost-benefit analysis should be an ingredient in the analysis, showing 
people that the consequences of various approaches might be different from 
what they seem. 
B.  Quantification and Expressive Rationality 
I have noted that the cost-benefit chart described above raised many 
questions. Those questions might be made into a thoroughgoing challenge to 
cost-benefit analysis. In an extensive discussion, Lisa Heinzerling has attempted 
to do precisely that.47 Heinzerling argues that many of the values depend on 
controversial judgments of value, and that the table itself masks those judgments. 
Her first point is that the table includes many regulations that were in fact 
rejected. Some of them were not issued on the ground that their benefits would 
exceed their costs. The table is also underinclusive, for many regulations have 
been issued that impose dramatically lower costs than many of those included on 
the table. But by itself this is no indictment of cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, it 
                                                 
46 At least assuming the decisions involve nothing peculiar or invidious, such as racial animus. 
47 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998). 
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provides support for cost-benefit analysis insofar as it suggests that the tool has 
resulted in a rejection of undesirable regulations. 
But Heinzerling goes further. She contends that many of these numbers 
depend on controversial judgments about how to discount future benefits. 
Above all, the charts depend on a 10% discount rate, whereas the agencies 
tended to use a lower discount rate, or not to discount at all. Heinzerling also 
suggests that the charts depend on downward adjustment of the agency’s 
estimates of risk. Her own estimates result in the following risk table, adjusted 
for inflation. 
 




Adjusted Cost Estimate  
(Thousands of 1995 
dollars) 
Asbestos (OSHA 1972) $700 
Benzene (OSHA 1985) $2,570 
Arsenic/Glass Plant (EPA 1986) $6,610 
Ethylene Oxide (OSHA 1984) $3,020-$5,780 
Uranium Mill Tailings/Inactive (EPA 1983) $2,410 
Acrylonitrile (OSHA 1978) $8,570 
Uranium Mill Tailings/Active (EPA 1983) $3,840 
Coke Ovens (OSHA 1976) $12,420 
Asbestos (OSHA 1986) $3,860 
Arsenic (OSHA 1978) $24,490 
Arsenic/Los-Arsenic Copper (EPA 1986) $5,740 
Land Disposal (EPA 1986) $3,280 
Formaldehyde (OSHA 1985) $31,100 
 
This table may be more accurate than Table I; certainly there are problems 
with any approach that assumes a 10% discount rate. But even if Heinzerling’s 
table is better, it offers an ironic lesson, serving largely to confirm the point that 
current regulatory policy suffers from poor priority-setting. The disparities here 
are not as dramatic, and they certainly do not establish pervasive overregulation; 
but they do support the view that resources are being misallocated.  
Heinzerling does not, however, conclude that this revised table is the 
appropriate basis for evaluating regulatory policy. Her aim is not to come up 
with a better table from which to reassess government behavior. On the contrary, 
she takes her argument to be a basis for rejecting cost-benefit analysis altogether. 
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This, then, is a lesson about “the perils of precision.”48 Heinzerling also suggests 
that it “would be better if we left the picture blurry, and declined to connect the 
dots between all the confusing and sometimes conflictiung intuitions and 
evidence.”49 She is concerned that “some, probably many, people will be fooled 
into believing that numerical estimates of risks, costs, and benefits are impartial 
reflections of factual reality, in which case the likely result of increased reliance 
on quantification in setting regulatory policy will be that the side that best 
obscures the value choices implicit in its numbers will prevail.”50 
There is considerable truth here; but I think that Heinzerling’s lesson is 
overdrawn. Truth first: If an agency says that the cost of regulation is one 
hundred million dollars, and the benefit seventy million dollars, we still know 
much less than we should. It is important to know who bears these costs, and if 
possible with what consequences. Will wages be lower? Whose wages? Will 
prices be higher? Of what products? A disaggregated picture of the benefits 
would also be important; what does the seventy million dollar figure represent? 
Consider, for example, a recent table explaining that the costs of skin cancer, 
from health effects of reducing tropospheric ozone, are between $290 million and 
$1.1 billion, with dollar subtotals for skin cancers and cataracts.51 By itself, this 
table is insufficiently informative to tell people what they need to know. 
Heinzerling is therefore on firm ground if she means to suggest that the 
dollar numbers cannot substitute for a fuller inquiry into what is at stake. Any 
cost-benefit analysis should include more than the monetary values by, for 
example, showing what the values are about, such as life-years saved and 
accidents averted (see the Appendix for illustrations). But her own table suggests 
that the general conclusion—that cost-benefit analysis can illuminate and 
discipline inquiry—remains unassailable. If regulation ranges from tens of 
thousands to tens of millions per life saved, at least there is a presumptive 
problem. One of the functions of cost-benefit balancing is to help show where 
limited resources should go. In fact there is much to be gained from attempting 
to quantify various effects, to the extent that this is possible. A regulation of 
particulates is hard to evaluate without knowing, for example, the number of 
deaths averted and the range of consequences for morbidity: How many work-
                                                 
48 Id. at 2042. 
49 Id. at 2069. 
50 Id. at 2068. 
51 See Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screening by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the 
NAAQS, 31 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 142A, 145 (1997). In fairness to the authors, it should be noted that a previous 
table in their essay describes adverse health effects in quantitative terms by listing the numbers of cases 
averted. 
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days will be saved that would otherwise be lost? How many hospitalizations will 
be avoided? How many asthma attacks will be prevented? It could even be 
useful to attempt to describe these effects in terms of “quality-adjusted life 
years,”52 knowing that here too, a good analyst will go back and forth between 
bottom lines and the judgments that go into their creation. 
I suspect that there may be theoretical claims behind Heinzerling’s 
skepticism about quantification. She may believe that many of the goods at stake 
in regulation (human and animal life and health, recreational and aesthetic 
opportunities) are not merely commodities, that people do not value these goods 
in the same way that they value cash, and that cost-benefit analysis, by its 
reductionism, is inconsistent with people’s reflective judgments about the issues 
at stake. Arguments of this sort have been developed in some philosophical 
challenges to cost-benefit analysis.53  
Such arguments are convincing if cost-benefit analysis is taken to suggest a 
controversial position in favor of the commensurability of all goods—if cost-
benefit is seen to insist that people value environmental amenities, or their own 
lives, in the same way that they value a bank account, or if cost-benefit is taken as 
a metaphysical claim to the effect that all goods can be aligned along a single 
metric, or if five lives saved is seen as the same, in some deep sense, as $20-$30 
million saved. Part of what people express, in their daily lives, is a resistance to 
this form of commensurability, and some goods are believed to have intrinsic as 
well as instrumental value.54 The existence of qualitative differences among 
goods fortifies the claim that any “bottom line” about costs and benefits should 
be supplemented with a more qualitative description of the variables involved. 
But cost-benefit analysis should not be seen as embodying a reductionist account 
of the good, and much less as a suggestion that everything is simply a 
“commodity” for human use. It is best taken as pragmatic instrument, agnostic 
on the deep issues and designed to assist people in making complex judgments 
where multiple goods are involved. To put it another way, cost-benefit analysis 
might be assessed pragmatically, or even politically, rather than metaphysically. 
We should conclude that the final number may provide less information 
than the ingredients that went into it, and that officials should have and present 
cost-benefit analysis in sufficiently full terms to enable people to have a concrete 
sense of the effects of regulation. This is an argument against some 
                                                 
52 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1995); 
American Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 1999 WL 300618 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 1999). 
53 See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993). 
54 See id. 
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overambitious understandings of what cost-benefit balancing entails. But it is not 
an argument against cost-benefit balancing. 
C.  Rival Rationalities 
The final objection to the discussion thus far is the most fundamental. On this 
view, cost-benefit analysis is not desirable as a check on ordinary intuitions, 
because those intuitions reflect a kind of “rival rationality.” Ordinary people 
have a complex understanding of what it is that they want to maximize. They do 
not simply tabulate lives saved; they ask questions as well about whether the 
relevant risk is controllable, voluntary, dreaded, equitably distributed, and 
potentially catastrophic. Consider the Table 4. 
Some people suggest that to the extent that ordinary people disagree with 
experts, they have a “thicker” or “richer” rationality, and that democracy should 
respect their judgments.55 On a more moderate view, government’s task is to 
distinguish between lay judgments that are products of factual mistakes 
(produced, for example, by the availability heuristic), and lay judgments that are 
products of judgments of value (as in the view that voluntarily incurred risks 
deserve less attention than those that are involuntarily occurred ones).56 In any 
case the “psychometric paradigm” is designed show how ordinary people’s 
judgments are responsive to an array of factors other than lives saved.57 
 
Table 4: Aggravating and mitigating factors in risk judgments 
 
Risk Traits Aggravating Mitigating 
Familiarity New Old 
Personal control Uncontrollable Controllable 
Voluntariness Involuntary Voluntary 
Media attention Heavy media 
coverage 
Ignored by media 
Equity Unfairly distributed Equitably distributed 
Children Children at special 
risk 
Children not at risk 
Future generations Future generations at 
risk 
Future generations not 
at risk 
                                                 
55 See Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective, 
in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 241 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985);   
56 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1995). 
57 See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battlefield, 44 
U. Chi. Leg. F. 59 (1997). 
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Reversibility Irreversible Reversible 
Identifiability of 
victims 
Victims known Victims not identifiable 
Accompanying 
benefits 
Benefits clear Benefits invisible 
Source Human origin Created by nature 
Trust in relevant 
institutions 
Low trust in relevant 
institutions 
High trust in relevant 
institutions 
Timing of adverse 
effects  
Effects delayed Effects immediate 
Understanding Mechanisms poorly 
understood 
Mechanisms understood 
Precedents History of accidents No past accidents 
 
One problem with this view is that it may not be a criticism of cost-benefit 
analysis at all; it may suggest only that any judgment about benefits and costs 
(whether or not based on willingness to pay) will have to take account of 
people’s divergent assessments of divergent risks. In principle, there is no 
problem with doing exactly that. There is, however, reason to question the now-
conventional view that qualitative factors of this kind in fact explain people’s 
disagreement with experts about certain risks of death. In fact I do not believe 
that the “psychometric paradigm” can defend its own central claims. The first 
point is technical. In the relevant studies, the key factors—voluntariness, 
controllability, potentially catastrophic nature—have not been generated 
spontaneously or independently by subjects. Instead those who conduct the 
relevant research ask people to rank risks along these dimensions . From this 
information it cannot be said that ordinary people think that these qualitative 
differences justify departing from the “lives saved” criterion. The evidence is 
simply too indirect. 
Now this does not mean that the “rival rationalities” view is wrong. There is 
independent evidence to suggest that people consider some deaths to be worse 
than others.58 They are apparently willing to pay more, for example, to prevent a 
cancer death than to prevent an unforeseen instant death, and there is some 
evidence that voluntarily incurred risks receive less social concern than risks that 
are involuntarily incurred. Distributional judgments also appear to play some 
role in assessments about how to allocate scarce resources. But these points raise 
further questions.59 
                                                 
58 Some of the data is collected in Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 259 (1997).  
59 I draw heavily in the next pages from id.; Margolis, supra note, contains an excellent discussion of this 
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 22 
No doubt it is possible that people’s judgments about risk severity are a 
product of some of the more qualitative considerations listed above; this idea 
leads to the widespread view that ordinary people have a “richer” rationality 
than do experts, since ordinary people look at the nature and causes of death, not 
simply at aggregate deaths at issue. But it is also possible that an apparently 
“rich” judgment that a certain risk is severe, or not severe, depend not on well-
considered judgments of value, but instead on an absence of ordinary contextual 
cues, on a failure to see that tradeoffs are inevitably being made, on heuristic 
devices that are not well-adapted to the particular context, or instead on a range 
of confusing or confused ideas that people cannot fully articulate. When people 
say, for example, that the risk of nuclear power is very serious, they may be 
responding to their intense visceral concern, possibly based on (uninformed) 
statistical judgments about likely lives at risk and on their failure to see (as they 
do in other contexts) that that risk is accompanied by a range of social benefits. 
Thus it is possible that a judgment that a certain risk of death is unusually bad is 
not a “rich” qualitative assessment but an (unreliable) intuition based on a rapid 
balancing that prominently includes perceived lives at stake and the perceived 
presence of small or no benefits associated with the risk-producing activity.  
Thus the question becomes whether citizen judgments that certain deaths are 
especially bad can survive a process of reflection. My conclusion is that 
understood in a certain way, the notions of dreaded deaths and unfairly 
distributed deaths are fully reasonable and deserve a role in policy. But the 
special concerns about deaths stemming from involuntarily run and 
uncontrollable risks raise serious doubts; as frequently invoked, they do not 
justify according additional concern to deaths that “code” as a product of 
involuntary or uncontrollable risks. At most, they suggest that government 
might spend more resources on deaths where the cost of risk-avoidance is 
especially high, and devote less attention to deaths where the cost of risk-
avoidance is especially low.  
1. Dread 
It is often said, on the basis of evidence like that outlined above, that 
especially dreaded deaths deserve special attention. Deaths from cancer and 
AIDS fall in this category. There is nothing at all mysterious to this idea. The 
underlying point is probably that the relevant deaths are especially grueling and 
hence there is a kind of “pain and suffering premium”—not merely a life lost, but 
an antecedent period of intense emotional and physical difficulty as well. This 
period of intense difficulty might impose costs on those with the illness and on 
friends and family members as well. Sudden, unanticipated deaths can be 
                                                                                                                                                 
point, from which I have learned a great deal. 
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dreaded too—consider the extremely unpleasant idea of dying in an airplane 
crash. But the dread here stems from some factor (perhaps terror) different from 
and much shorter than the extended period of suffering that precedes some 
deaths. Thus it might be concluded that dreaded deaths deserve special attention 
in accordance with the degree of suffering that precedes them. A special problem 
with cancer deaths is that at least some of the time, people like to have upward-
sloping utility. It is particularly bad to be in a situation in which things will 
constantly get worse.60 With cancer deaths, the slope goes downward fairly 
consistently until the point of death.  
2. Voluntariness 
People seem to perceive voluntarily incurred risks as less troublesome than 
involuntarily incurred risks. Consider diverse public reactions to airplane crashes 
and automobile crashes. Or consider the fact that tobacco is by far the largest 
source of preventable deaths in the United States. Why do we not devote much 
more of our regulatory effort to reducing smoking? The reason seems to lie in a 
judgment that smoking is a voluntary activity and hence the resulting deaths are 
less troublesome than other sorts of deaths. Here—it might be said—people have 
voluntarily assumed the relevant risks. 
a. Puzzles: high cost of avoidance rather than involuntariness?  
It is tempting to think that the apparent lay preference for according greater 
weight to “involuntary” risks to life requires significant qualification of the 
criterion of lives or life-years saved. But a simple reference to voluntariness, if 
taken to suggest something special about “lay rationality,” raises many puzzles. 
The most important problem is that it is not simple to know when a risk is 
voluntarily incurred. “Voluntariness” may be entirely absent in the case of an 
unforeseeable collision with an asteroid; but voluntariness is not, in the cases 
under consideration, an all-or-nothing matter. Instead it is a matter of degree. 
Return to the conventional thought that airplane crashes are “involuntary” and 
automobile crashes more “voluntary.” Certainly it would be possible to see the 
risks from air travel as voluntarily run; people have a choice about whether to 
fly, and when they do fly, they pay a certain amount for a certain package, 
including risks of various sorts. The same is true of automobile safety—and it is 
not in any way less true, however disparately the two kinds of risks may “seem.” 
Perhaps people are responding to the perceived fact that they have no control 
over the pilot’s behavior, whereas they have considerable control over 
automobile safety since they are themselves drivers. But airlines respond to 
                                                 
60 See George Loewenstein & Nachom Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage Profiles?, 9 J. Lab. 
Econ. 67, 71-75 (1991); George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Negative Time Preference, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 
(Papers & Proc.) 347, 347 (1991). 
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market forces, including the market for safety, and many people injured in 
automobile accidents are not at fault, and thus along the dimension of 
voluntariness this is hardly a crisp distinction. The difference between the two 
risks is hardly so categorical as to justify an assessment that they fall on poles of 
some voluntariness-involuntariness divide. Indeed, it is not clear even what is 
meant by the suggestion that one is voluntary and the other is not. Something 
else appears to underlie that suggestion. 
b. Three cases 
To shed some light on the issue, let us consider three classes of cases. First, 
consider the question whether workers exposed to cancer risks are voluntarily or 
involuntarily so exposed. If workers do not know about such risks—if they lack 
relevant information—we seem to have an easy case of involuntariness. Thus it 
makes sense to say that risks are run involuntarily when the people running 
them do not know about them. Lack of adequate information provides a 
legitimate case for a judgment of involuntary exposure to risk. But of course 
information itself can be obtained at some cost, pecuniary or otherwise. We are 
thus dealing, in cases of this kind, with high costs of risk avoidance, in the 
distinctive form of high costs of acquiring relevant information. 
Second, suppose that people who are exposed to a certain risk are aware of 
the risk, but are not in an actual or potential contractual relation with the risk-
producer. Many victims of pollution are in this position; recall that in surveys air 
pollution is a particular source of public concern., People in Los Angeles may 
well know that they face high levels of smog. Are they exposed involuntarily? If 
we conclude that they are, we may mean that a risk is incurred involuntarily 
when and in the sense that it is typically very expensive for people to avoid it—
and when someone else can reduce the risks more cheaply. Here a claim that the 
risk is faced “involuntarily” may mean that those who “run” the risk can reduce 
it only at very high cost, at least compared to those who “produce” the risk. (The 
quotation marks are necessary for obvious Coasian reasons.) Or it is possible that 
we mean that on nonutilitarian grounds, the people exposed to the risk have a 
moral entitlement to be free from it, at least if they have not explicitly sold it. 
But turn now to a third class of cases, involving a wage package or contract 
that does include compensation for the relevant risks. Assuming that point, we 
might want to distinguish between two different possibilities. In a case of a high-
level scientist, knowledgeable about relevant risks and involved in work that he 
finds rewarding, people may well conclude that we have an instance of 
voluntariness. (In the same category can be found the case of an astronaut.) But 
people might not say the same about a low-level worker who does not like his 
work at all (cf. Anderson, 1993). What distinguishes the two cases? If knowledge 
is present, or if the compensation package includes payment for the relevant risk, 
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it is not clear how the two differ. The underlying judgment must be that the 
compensation is inadequate, perhaps because background inequality has 
produced a wage package that seems unfair even if voluntarily chosen by the 
parties. 
From this discussion it seems reasonable to speculate that any judgment that 
a risk is run “involuntarily” is probably based on 1) a lack of knowledge of the 
risk, or, more accurately, high costs of obtaining information about the risk, 2) a 
belief that information to one side, it would be very costly for people to avoid the 
risk, or 3) a belief that the risk is unaccompanied by compensating benefits, 
notwithstanding their belief that the contract is in some sense worth signing. It 
may seem hard to make sense of 3); what might be at work is a judgment that 
background inequalities are producing the relevant bargain (not by itself a good 
reason to disrupt the deal), or perhaps a belief that workers are competing to 
their collective detriment, and an agreement not to compete would be in their 
best interests. On this view, the question whether a risk is run voluntarily or not 
is often not a categorical one but instead a question of degree, associated with 
information cost, risk-reduction cost, and the existence or not of accompanying 
benefits. Of course there are interesting background questions about why and 
when a risk “codes” as voluntary or involuntary; undoubtedly the answer 
depends a great deal on heuristic devices and selective attention. 
c. The purpose for which the risk is incurred and problems of responsibility and blame 
Death-risks may seem “voluntarily” run when people do not approve of the 
purpose for which people run the relevant risks, and involuntarily run when 
people think that the purpose for which the risk is run is laudable. It is 
predictable that people will not want to pour enormous taxpayer resources into 
lowering the risks associated with sky-diving, even if the dollars/life-years saved 
ratio is quite good. By contrast, it is doubtful that people think that it is wrong to 
spend enormous resources on the prevention of death from childbirth or being a 
police officer, even though the decision to have a child is (with appropriate 
qualifications) voluntary, and so too with the decision to become a police officer. 
People may think that when the appeal or purpose of the activity is associated 
with its very riskiness, resources should not be devoted to risk-reduction. At 
least this is plausible when the risk is an independent good or part of the benefit 
of the activity. And it is easy to imagine a belief that some activities—unsafe sex, 
cigarette smoking—are like the sky-diving case, perhaps because the risk is 
sometimes part of the benefit, perhaps because the risks are not incurred for a 
purpose that observers find worthy or valuable. 
It might seem that this consideration—the purpose for which the risk is 
incurred—overlaps with or is even identical to the question whether there are 
high costs of risk-avoidance. When the costs are low, as in sky-diving, the 
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purpose might seem inadequate. But on reflection the two ideas are hardly the 
same. It may well be that failing to sky-dive, or sky-diving with some safety-
increasing technology, imposes high costs on sky-divers. There seems to be an 
objective judgment, not necessarily connected with subjective costs, in the claim 
that some risks are voluntary, or deserve less attention, because they are run for 
inadequate purposes. 
Relatedly, airplane accidents may seem different from automobile accidents 
not because the former are less voluntary, and not because of diverse costs of risk 
avoidance, but because the victims of airplane accidents are less blameworthy 
than the victims of automobile accidents, in the sense that the death is not a 
product of their own negligence or misconduct. In the case of an airplane 
disaster, weather conditions, mechanical failure, or pilot error are likely causes; 
in the case of an automobile accident, it is more likely (though not of course 
certain) that the victim could have avoided death through more careful driving. 
The point is crude, since many victims of automobile accidents are not drivers, 
and many drivers in accidents do not behave negligently. But the perceived 
difference, in a significant number of cases, may underlie an apparent judgment 
of “voluntariness” that is really a judgment about responsibility and 
blameworthiness. In any case judgments are likely to be affected, and distorted, 
by the fact that drivers seem to be risk optimists—with 90% ranking themselves 
as safer than the average driver and less likely to be involved in an accident.61 
This is another place—illusions of control and risk optimism—where cognitive 
psychology argues in favor of cost-benefit analysis. 
d. Underlying questions and assumption of risk 
We might therefore conclude that whether a risk qualifies as involuntary 
raises many of the questions raised by the question whether government should 
regulate the market at all. A risk might be characterized as involuntarily run 
because affected people lack relevant information; because the transactions costs 
of bargaining are high; because the risks should be seen to amount to 
externalities; because collective action problems make market outcomes 
unsatisfactory since (for example) workers are in a prisoner’s dilemma best 
solved through law; or because some motivational or cognitive defect makes 
successful solutions through markets unlikely. These of course are among the 
conventional grounds for regulation in the first instance. When a risk seems 
voluntary, and not worthy of substantial regulatory resources, the term 
“voluntary” is serving as a placeholder for an argument that there is no sufficient 
ground for government action, because the accompanying benefits are high or 
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the risk-reduction costs are low, and because market arrangements take adequate 
account of these facts.  
Should voluntarily run risks of death receive no public attention, on the 
ground that the relevant people have already received compensation? We might 
imagine a death-risk to be incurred voluntarily when an informed person 
decided to incur it in light of its costs and benefits. Suppose, for example, that 
someone purchases a small car with fewer safety features, or decides to become a 
boxer, an astronaut, or a police officer in a dangerous neighborhood. If a death 
results from such a choice, it might seem that the chooser has no legitimate 
ground for complaint; there has been ex ante compensation for the risk. But even 
in such cases, it is not clear that government lacks a role. If government can 
reduce a serious risk at low cost, and thus eliminate deaths, it should do so even 
if there was ex ante compensation for the relevant risk. There is a general point 
here. Sometimes observers confuse two quite different questions: (1) Should 
people be banned from running a certain risk, when they have run that risk 
voluntarily? (2) Should government attempt to reduce a certain risk, when 
people have run that risk voluntarily? A negative answer to question (1) does not 
answer question (2). 
From this point we should conclude that a lay judgment that a risk is 
“voluntary” should not be decisive. A better understanding of what factors 
underlie and support that judgment should be used for purposes of regulatory 
policy. The basic criterion of decently livable life years might, then, be adjusted 
upward when those at risk lack relevant information or when the costs of risk-
avoidance are especially high—or downward when those at risk have the 
information and when the costs of risk-avoidance are low. 
3. Ripple Effects 
The psychological evidence suggests, thought it does not squarely identify, 
an important and relevant fact: Some deaths produce unusually high 
externalities, in the sense that they generate widespread losses, including those 
stemming from empathy and fear, in a way that leads to predictable pecuniary 
and nonpecuniary costs. Consider, for example, the death of the President of the 
United States, a death that imposes a wide range of costs and that taxpayers 
invest significant resources to prevent. Part of the reason for allocating those 
resources is undoubtedly the greater risk that the President will be murdered; 
but the external costs associated with his death are undoubtedly important too. A 
parallel can be found in the relatively large level of resources devoted to prevent 
the assassination of many important public officials. But the point is hardly 
limited to the highest public officials. An airplane hijacking or crash, partly 
because it is likely to be well-publicized, may produce large externalities in the 
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form of empathy and fear. It may even deter air travel by making people 
unusually frightened of air travel, simply because of heuristic devices 
(availability) and other predictable factors that make people’s probability 
assessments go awry. This fear may be damaging because it is itself a utility loss 
and because it may lead people to use less safe methods of transportation, such 
as automobiles. Or an airplane crash might be especially disturbing because the 
sudden loss of dozens or hundreds of people seems so unusually and senselessly 
tragic, in a way that produces large empathetic reactions, or because it signals the 
further possibility of random, apparently inexplicable events in which large 
numbers of people die.  
Some catastrophes are especially disturbing because they appear to produce 
pointless and especially unnatural deaths. A recent airplane crash in Israel, 
killing over seventy soldiers, is an example, producing an extended period of 
national mourning—stemming from the youth of those who were killed, the fact 
that they were serving their country, and the highly unusual character of the 
accident, apparently stemming from preventable human error. These 
considerations suggest that special attention might justifiably be devoted to air 
safety in the time following a crash even if the relevant precautions do not cause 
a significant drop in deaths. The same idea may justify special safeguards of 
nuclear reactors. Even a minor and harmless accident may produce a kind of 
day-to-day fearfulness that properly places a role in an official calculus, at least if 
educative efforts cannot work against public fears to the extent that they are 
irrational or based on error-producing heuristic.  
Special public concern about catastrophic events may thus reflect a judgment 
that certain kinds of deaths have ancillary effects, well beyond the deaths 
themselves. Consider in this regard the “Buffalo Creek Syndrome,” documented 
several times in the aftermath of major disasters. Nearly two years after the 
collapse of a dam that left 120 dead and 4000 homeless, psychiatric researchers 
continued to find significant psychological and sociological changes; survivors 
were characterized by a loss of direction and energy, other disabling character 
changes, and a loss of communality.62 One evaluator attributed this loss of 
direction specifically to “the loss of traditional bonds of kinship and 
neighborliness.”63 The non-linearity of lay evaluations of risk in the context of 
potential disasters may thus reflect a high premium on avoiding the distinctive 
kinds of losses distinctly associated with catastrophes. If so, differences between 
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lay and expert assessments rest on genuine value differences (four times as many 
deaths may be much more than four times as bad) rather than on factual errors in 
cognitive processes of ordinary people.  
These various points raise a number of questions. We do not yet have a full 
understanding of the basis for special public concern with catastrophes. 
Moreover, the argument for devoting special resources to deaths with 
externalities is strongest when the externalities do not reflect irrationality or 
cannot be reduced through other means. For example, some of the fear that 
follows certain widely reported deaths is based on confusion or ignorance about 
actual probabilities; if it is possible to dispel the confusion, the fear should 
dissipate as well. Here the question is whether government can legitimately 
spend extra resources to avert the harms associated with irrational public 
attitudes. Perhaps information-based strategies would be preferable to allocating 
additional resources to deaths whose occurrence produces widespread panic. On 
the other hand, there are undoubtedly instances in which information is 
ineffective, and there are also cases in which high externalities, in the form of 
special fear, are not a product of factual ignorance. In such cases government is 
justified in giving additional resources to death-prevention. 
4. Inequitable Distribution 
Some risks might be, or be thought to be, inequitably distributed, above all 
because the victims are disproportionately members of socially disadvantaged 
groups. Certain deaths might, for example, be concentrated among poor people, 
African-Americans, or homosexuals. Consider the risk of lead paint poisoning 
suffered by inner city children, or the risk of AIDS, faced disproportionately by 
African-Americans as well as homosexuals. Citizens or elected representatives 
may think that inequitably distributed risks of death deserve special attention 
from government. Here the relevant deaths are bad not because each one is 
especially bad to experience, but because there is social concern about the fact 
that a certain cause of death falls disproportionately on members of certain social 
groups. 
When such social concern exists, and when it is not objectionable on 
constitutional or other grounds, it is entirely legitimate for officials to respond.64 
Thus regulators should be permitted to use a uniform number per life or life-
years saved; this is itself a (modest) redistributive strategy, because wealthy 
people (simply because they are wealthy) are willing to pay more to reduce risks 
than nonwealthy people. Regulators might also be permitted to give distributional 
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weights to risks whose distributional incidence is especially troublesome.65 These 
weights might take a technical form (through adding numbers to the ones that 
would otherwise be used) or appear via the official judgment about how to 
proceed after the cost-benefit analysis has been supplied (through deciding in 
favor of a strategy not strictly suggested by the numbers). The distributional 
concern supports special efforts to control AIDS; environmental risks like 
asthma, which are concentrated among inner city children; and perhaps the 
spread of diseases whose incidence is concentrated among women. My minimal 
claim is that if there is a public judgment in favor of according a distributional 
weight to a certain death-reduction policy, and if that judgment is not 
unconstitutional or otherwise illegitimate, policy makers should not be barred 
from respecting that judgment. 
5. No Rival Rationality 
I conclude that there is no “rival rationality,” and that people are willing to 
depart from the “lives saved” criterion for reasons that cast a clearer light on 
what it is that they are attempting to maximize. More particularly: 
 
a. People are willing to pay a premium to avoid deaths that involve 
a high degree of pain and suffering. At least presumptively, this desire, 
or judgment, should be respected by government regulators; the 
presumption might be rebutted if, for example, the “premium” seems so 
high as to suggest that some kind of irrationality is at work. 
b. People are willing to devote more resources to protect children. 
This judgment may depend on a belief that children are typically more 
vulnerable to risk, in the sense that they cannot protect themselves, or on 
a belief that more life-years are at stake when children are in jeopardy. In 
either case, this judgment too deserves respect. 
c. People are willing to pay a premium to avert catastrophes. This 
may depend on a belief that catastrophes have “ripple effects” that 
outrun lives actually lost. A plane crash killing 100 people may be worse 
than 100 deaths from poor diet, if the consequence of the former is to 
create pervasive fear and anxiety. A shooting in a high school may 
warrant special attention, keeping lives saved constant, if only in order 
to ensure that students and parents are not constantly fearful about the 
safety of schools. These “ripple effects” qualify as social costs and at first 
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glance seem to deserve special attention. The major qualification is that it 
may be possible to address them directly, rather than to cater (pander?) 
to them. Suppose, for example, that education can assure the public that 
flying is generally quite safe. If information can accomplish this end, it is 
better to provide it than to engage in regulation that is costly and that 
has no purpose other than to reassure. 
d. People are willing to devote more resources to protect against 
dangers when the costs of risk avoidance are high. Perhaps people do 
not have information about certain risks, and perhaps information is 
costly to obtain. Perhaps third parties are in danger, and perhaps it is 
costly for them to avoid the danger. This point may involve fairness; it 
may involve efficiency. It involves fairness if people believe that those 
who bear high costs from risk avoidance should not, in principle, have to 
bear those costs. If this is the underlying belief, then it may follow that 
those who can easily avoid the cost of some risk should, in principle, do 
exactly that. The point involves efficiency if the judgment is that the best 
means of reducing aggregate costs (public as well as private) is to 
regulate the entity that is imposing the relevant risk.  
e. People may believe that it is especially important to protect 
vulnerable or traditionally disadvantaged groups against certain risks. 
If, for example, AIDS is concentrated among African-Americans and 
homosexuals, there may be a special reason to devote resources to its 
prevention, even if quantitatively identical risks receive less attention.  
 
These various points suggest that there is no “rival rationality.” The question 
is whether people believe that some dangers deserve more attention than 
(quantitatively identical) others, and if so, whether that belief can survive critical 
scrutiny. But these points also suggest that it is wrong to think that policy should 
follow the judgments of experts focussed on the single question of “lives at 
stake.”66 This is not the social maxim and for reflective citizens. Such citizens 
have a different view about what their government ought to be doing. That 
different view does not embody any exotic conception of rationality. 
                                                 
66 This is the apparent recommendation in Margolis, supra note, though I am not sure that Margolis would 
agree with what I am suggesting here. 
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 32 
III. An Incompletely Theorized Agreement on Cost-Benefit Analysis? 
A. Problems With Aggregated Willingness to Pay 
Thus far I have suggested that cost-benefit analysis is a sensible approach to 
cognitive problems faced by ordinary people in the assessment of risk. I have 
also suggested that there is no democratic objection to using cost-benefit analysis 
as an ingredient in decisions, even a crucial ingredient, and that cost-benefit 
analysis can be understood in a way that responds to reasonable concerns about 
quantification and about the idea that the only thing to be maximized is total 
lives saved (or, somewhat better, life-years saved). 
But none of this deals with the general question how cost-benefit analysis 
should be understood. In the least contentious formulation—the formulation that 
I have used here—cost-benefit analysis is simply a form of open-ended 
consequentialism, an invitation to identify the advantages and disadvantages of 
regulation,67 an invitation that does not say anything about appropriate weights. 
The virtue of this formulation is that it is uncontentious; the vice is that it is 
vacuous. People can agree with it, but it does not mean anything. In its most 
contentious formulation, cost-benefit analysis depends on asking people how 
much they are “willing to pay” for various goods, and making decisions depend 
on the resulting numbers.68 Problems with this approach lie in a possible lack of 
private information; its possible distributional unfairness (since willingness to 
pay depends on ability to pay); potential differences between private willingness 
to pay and public aspirations69; and collective action problems of various sorts 
that might draw into doubt the privately-expressed amounts.70 It will be 
worthwhile to spell out these points in a bit more detail. 
“Willingness to pay” is a simple way to capture people’s valuations, and for 
this reason it has practical advantages. Indeed, it is a good place to start, 
especially in the absence of anything better. But it also suffers from several 
problems. First, willingness to pay may be a product of cognitive and 
motivational distortions of various kinds. Willingness to pay judgments may be 
insufficiently informed or reflective with respect to both facts and values. For 
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example, people may overstate the risks from various hazards that receive 
disproportionate media attention. If this is so, it seems odd to base government 
policy on those judgments.  
It is also possible that people will be willing to pay little to avoid some bad X 
simply because they are used to it and their preferences have adapted 
accordingly.71 For example, people may not care about scenic areas simply 
because they have not been exposed to them. Preferences based on lack of 
information or adaptation to deprivation are hardly a good basis for regulatory 
policy. They need not be taken as given and translated into law. In any case 
private preferences may be a product of social norms over which individuals 
have little control, by which they live, but which they would like to change if 
they could. If people are willing to pay little to avoid some risk (for example, of 
smoking) because of prevailing norms that they would wish changed, 
willingness to pay is unjustified as a basis for policy, since the norm could be 
changed through collective action.72 
Second, willingness to pay is imperfectly correlated with utility—at best 
the first is a proxy for the second—and the two should not be confused in 
principle. One problem is that poor people are willing to pay less than wealthy 
people simply by virtue of being poor, and their willingness to pay for something 
(eg, a reduced mortality risk) is crudely connected with the utility that they 
would gain from it. In the face of disparities in wealth, willingness to pay should 
not be identified with expected utility or with the value actually placed on the 
good in question.73 Third, there is a purely distributive concern.74 Because poor 
people have less money than wealthy people, they are willing to pay less for 
equivalent goods (such as reduced risks to life). The result of the use of 
willingness to pay would be to produce greater expenditures to protect wealthy 
people than poor people, a controversial result to say the least.75 Fourth, the 
willingness to pay criterion will produce losers as well as winners, and many of 
the losers will go uncompensated; it is scant comfort to say that they could be 
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compensated with side payments or a system of optimal taxation. Hence an 
attempt to defend cost-benefit analysis by reference to the efficiency criterion, as 
measured by private willingness to pay, runs into great difficulties, at least 
unless steps are taken to ensure against distributional bias.76 
Fifth, and finally, there may be differences between the choices people make 
as consumers and the choices that they make as citizens, and it is not clear that 
the former should be preferred. The context of citizenship may evoke other-
regarding or altruistic values, or preferences, that are not reflected in private 
choices. This is partly because aggregating private willingness to pay can 
replicate various collective action problems faced in the private domain; people 
may be willing to pay more simply because they know that other people are 
contributing as well.77 If this is so, it makes no sense to base policy on private 
willingness to pay, where the collective action problem arises.  
In any case we might think that government policy should be based on the 
reasons given for one or another outcome, and the fact that people are “willing to 
pay” a lot or a little for some outcome tells us too little about whether good 
reasons exist. Before discussion, for example, people may be willing to pay a fair 
bit to discriminate on the basis of sex, and they may be willing to pay little to 
protect large populations of animals that are at risk. These judgments may 
change as a result of reason-giving in the public domain. In other words, 
government is a place for exchanging reasons for one or another course or action. 
It is not simply a maximizing machine, taking private willingness to pay as the 
foundation, whatever the source or the grounds of pre-discussion preferences. 
A particular problem here is that people may not want to spend a great deal 
to protect (for example) environmental amenities because they seek to protect 
their (relative) financial position.78 A regulatory program supported by all might 
maintain relative position, which may be what people care about. Current 
willingness to pay numbers do not take account of this possibility. There is thus 
good reason for an empirical speculation here, one that suggests that current 
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numbers are far too low. Much further work remains to be done to test whether 
people would in fact be willing to spend more for safety, or for environmental 
amenities, if the result would be significant decreases in absolute income but the 
same relative income. 
Nor would it be sensible to disregard the presence of tragic choices, as when 
cost-benefit analysis leads to a choice of course A over course B, but course A 
leads to uncompensated losers (a group whose members may suffer from serious 
illnesses and even death).79 Perhaps it is possible, in such cases, to restructure 
social arrangements so as to reduce or eliminate the tragedy. But even if this is 
so, a cost-benefit analysis, of the sort to be described, can help inform a decision 
about what tragedy-reducing course to take, and whether such a course is 
worthwhile at all. 
B. Incomplete Theorization: Cost-Benefit Analysis As Political, Not Metaphysical 
Often it is possible to resolve hard questions of law and policy without 
resolving deeply contested issues about justice, democracy, or the appropriate 
aims of the state.80 Often it is possible to obtain an incompletely theorized 
agreement on a social practice, and even on the social or legal specification of the 
practice. In many areas of law and public policy, people can reach closure about 
what to do despite their disagreement or uncertainty about why, exactly, that 
ought to do it. Thus people who disagree about the purposes of the criminal law 
can agree that rape and murder should be punished, and punished more 
severely than theft and trespass. Thus people can support an Endangered Species 
Act amidst disagreement about whether the protection of endangered species is 
desirable for theological reasons, or because of the rights of animals, plants, and 
species, or because of the value of animals, plants, and species for human beings. 
A great advantage of incompletely theorized agreements is that they allow 
people of diverse views to live together on mutually advantageous terms. An 
even greater advantage is that they allow people of diverse views to show one 
another a high degree of both humility and mutual respect. 
I believe that incompletely theorized agreement is possible here; at least this 
should be the goal of those attempting to understand the uses of cost-benefit 
analysis in regulatory policy. For reasons just discussed, it would be difficult to 
obtain agreement on the view (which seems to me implausible) that all questions 
of regulatory policy should be resolved by asking how much people are “willing 
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80 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A 
Time (1999). 
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 36 
to pay” for various social goods.81 But my basic claims here are that it should be 
possible for diverse people to agree on presumptive floors and ceilings for 
regulatory expenditures, and that the presumptions can do a great deal of useful 
work for policymaking and for law. In short, a great deal can be done without 
confronting the hardest theoretical questions raised by contentious specifications 
of cost-benefit analysis. 
An obvious question here is: Who could join this incompletely theorized 
agreement? Who would reject it? My principal claim is that the agreement could 
be joined by a wide range of reasonable people, including utilitarians and 
Kantians, perfectionist and political liberals, and those who accept and those who 
doubt the idea that private willingness to pay is the appropriate foundation for 
regulatory policy. There is room here for deliberative democrats who emphasize 
the need for government to reflect on private preferences, rather than simply to 
translate them into law.82 A prime purpose of the approach is to ensure more in 
the way of reflection; cost-benefit analysis, as understood here, is a guarantee of 
greater deliberation, not an obstacle to it. Nor is the approach rigid. Under the 
proposed approach, agencies have the authority to abandon the floors and 
ceilings if there is reason for them to do so. If, for example, agencies want to 
spend a great deal to protect African-American children from a risk 
disproportionately faced by them, they are entitled to do so, as long as they 
explain that this is what they are doing, and so long as what they are doing in 
reasonable.  
C. Eight Propositions 
Here, then, are eight propositions, offered in the hope that they might attract 
support from diverse theoretical standpoints. I do not attempt to defend them in 
detail here; The goal is to provide a starting point for the effort to anchor cost-
benefit analysis in an incompletely theorized agreement about regulatory 
policies. 
                                                 
81 See Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 
1999). 
82 Absolutists of various kinds might refuse to join an agreement on these principles. Perhaps their refusal 
would be most reasonable in the case of the Endangered Species Act, where nothing said below explains 
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here with environmental and related risks, and hence many of the most contentious issues (e.g., how to treat 
the wrongdoer’s motivation, or how to deal with rights violators) do not arise. See Sen, The Discipline of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra.  
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1. Agencies should identify the advantages and disadvantages of proposed 
courses of action, and also attempt to quantify the relevant effects to the extent 
that this is possible. When quantification is not possible, agencies should 
discuss the relevant effects in qualitative terms, and also specify a range 
of plausible outcomes, e.g., annual savings of between 150 and 300 lives, 
or savings of between $100 million and $300 million, depending on the 
rate of technological change. The statement should include the full 
range of beneficial effects. The problem of particulates and ozone 
regulation poses some serious difficulties to challengers to cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA); if the EPA is not to do a form of CBA, what is it to do, 
concretely? 
2. The quantitative description should supplement rather than displace a 
qualitative description of relevant effects. Both qualitative and quantitative 
descriptions should be provided. It is important to know the nature of 
the relevant effects, e.g., lost workdays, cancers averted, respiratory 
problems averted. To the extent possible, the qualitative description 
should give a concrete sense of who is helped and who is hurt, e.g., 
whether the beneficiaries are mostly or partly children, whether the 
regulation will lead to lost jobs, higher prices, more poverty, and so 
forth. Where the only possible information is speculative, this should be 
noted, along with the most reasonable speculations. 
3. Agencies should attempt to convert nonmonetary values (involving, for 
example, lives saved, health gains, and aesthetic values) into dollar equivalents. 
This is not because a statistical life and (say) $5 million are the same 
thing, but to promote coherence and uniformity and to ensure sensible 
priority-setting. There is nothing magical or rigid about the dollar 
equivalents; the conversion is simply a pragmatic tool to guide analysis 
and to allow informed comparisons.  
4. Agencies entrusted with valuing life and health should be controlled, by 
statute or Executive Order, via presumptive floors and ceilings. For example, 
a statute might say that a statistical life will ordinarily be valued at no 
less than $2 million and no more than $10 million. Evidence of worker 
and consumer behavior, suggesting a valuation of between $5 million 
and $7 million per statistical life saved, is at least relevant here. The fact 
that the willingness to pay numbers are in this range is hardly decisive, 
but it is supplemented by the fact that similar numbers appear to 
represent the midpoint of agency practice. Thus both market and 
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governmental measures point in the same basic direction.83 OMB 
should establish presumptive floors and ceilings for various regulatory 
benefits. If an agency is going to spend (say) no more than $500,000 per 
life saved, or more than $20 million, it should have to explain itself. 
Actual agency practice reveals a mixed record. EPA now values a life at 
$4.8 million; some agencies go as high as $5.6 or as low as $1; and some 
agencies do not provide specific numbers at all. 
5. Agencies should be permitted to adjust the ceilings and floors, or to choose 
a low or high end of the range, on the basis of a publicly articulated and 
reasonable judgment that such an adjustment or such a choice is desirable. 
Perhaps adjustments could be made if, for example, poor people are 
especially at risk. There should be no adjustments “downwards” for 
poor people; in other words, the fact that poor people are willing to 
spend less to protect their own lives (because they are poor) should not 
call for a correspondingly lower expenditures by government. The 
principal danger here is that well-organized groups will be able to use 
equitable arguments on behalf of their preferred adjustments. It is 
important to ensure a degree of discipline here, and perhaps the 
dangers of interest-group manipulation are serious enough to suggest 
that uniform numbers or ranges might be used, or that the 
presumptions are strong and rebuttable only in the most compelling 
cases.84 
6. Agencies should be permitted to make adjustments on the basis of the 
various “qualitative” factors discussed above. For example, they might add 
a “pain and suffering premium,” or increase the level of expenditure 
because children are disproportionately affected or because the victims 
are members of a disadvantaged group. It would be reasonable to 
conclude that because AIDS has disproportionate adverse effects on 
homosexuals and poor people, special efforts should be made to ensure 
against AIDS-related deaths. To the extent possible, they should be 
precise about the nature of, and grounds for, the relevant adjustments, 
especially in light of the risk that interest-group pressures will convert 
allegedly qualitative adjustments in illegitimate directions.85 
                                                 
83 Note, however, that if relative position is what matters, these numbers may be too low, for reasons stated 
above. 
84 See Viscusi, Risk Equity, supra note. 
85 See id.; see also James Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks (1999) (showing that allegedly 
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7. The appropriate response to social fear not based on evidence, and to related 
“ripple effects,” is education and reassurance rather than increased regulation. 
Sometimes public concern about certain risks is general and intense, 
even though the concern is not merited by the facts.86 The best response 
is educational; the government should not expend significant resources 
merely because an uninformed public believes that it should. But if 
education and reassurance fail, increased regulation may be defensible 
as a way of providing a kind of reassurance in the face of intense fears, 
which can themselves impose high costs of various kinds. (Consider, for 
example, the possibility that people who afraid of risks of plane crashes 
will shift to driving, a more risky method of transportation; consider 
also the fact that the fear is itself a cost.) 
8. Unless the statute requires otherwise, judicial review of risk regulation 
should require a general showing that regulation has produced more good than 
harm, on a reasonable view about valuation of both benefits and costs.87 On 
this view, courts should generally require agencies to generate and to 
adhere to ceilings and floors. But they should also allow agencies to 
depart from conventional numbers (by, for example, valuing a life at 
less than $1 million, or more than $10 million) if and only if the agency 
has given a reasonable explanation of why it has done so. The ultimate 
task would be develop a kind of “common law” of cost-benefit analysis, 
authorizing agencies to be law-making institutions in the first instance.88 
IV. Conclusion 
I have suggested that cost-benefit analysis, often defended on economic 
grounds, can be urged less contentiously on cognitive grounds. Cost-benefit 
analysis, taken as an inquiry into the consequences of varying approaches to 
regulation,89 is a sensible response not only to interest-group power, but also to 
limited information and to predictable problems in the public demand for 
regulation. These problems include the use of the availability heuristic; social 
amplification of that heuristic via cascade effects; a failure to see the benefits that 
                                                 
86 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 
(1999). 
87 See Margolis, supra note. 
88 This has started to happen in various areas. See the development of a common law of “risk significance” 
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(forthcoming 1999). 
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accompany certain risks; a misunderstanding of systemic effects, which can lead 
to unanticipated bad (and good) consequences; and certain emotional reactions 
to risks. In all of these areas, an effort to identify costs and benefits can properly 
inform analysis.  
These points do not show how cost-benefit analysis should be specified. 
Here I have raised questions about the willingness to pay criterion and suggested 
that at least in principle, it would be obtuse to attempt to assess regulatory 
proposals via a uniform number for lives saved; but I have also suggested that 
presumptive ranges, for life as well as other beneficial effects on health and other 
values, would be an excellent way to clarify and order regulatory policy, in a 
way that should lead both to greater consistency and more overall protection. If 
ordinary market behavior and ordinary government behavior point to a similar 
basic range (e.g., $3 million to $7 million per life saved), that is an excellent place 
to start.  
My ultimate hope is that it would be possible to produce a convergence on a 
form of cost-benefit analysis that should be understood as a pragmatic 
instrument and that ought not to be terribly contentious—a form of cost-benefit 
analysis that does not take a stand on highly controversial questions about what 
government ought to do, and that promises to attract support from people with 
diverse conceptions of the right and the good. I have suggested here that the 
most promising source of such an agreement is not only or even mostly 
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